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1. Free will as psychological capacity 
 
Imagine writing a philosophy paper or a short story. You imagine a range of options for 
presenting the argument or the plot, the structure, some sentences. But first, the opening line. 
You want to get it right. There are better and worse answers to the question: How should I 
begin? And regarding the rest: How should I proceed? To ask these questions requires the 
capacity to imagine a range of alternatives, and there are better and worse alternatives to 
imagine. To answer these questions requires the capacities to select among those alternatives, 
and there are better and worse ways to select them. People possess, to varying degrees, the 
diverse range of psychological capacities needed to write a philosophy paper or story: capacities 
to imagine a wider range of relevant options, to shift attention away from less—and towards 
more—promising options, to select the better options, and to execute these choices—making the 
imagined future the actual one. Furthermore, different people, in different situations, have better 
and worse opportunities to exercise these capacities—for instance, free time to let the mind 
wander and put words on paper. We don’t know a lot about how these psychological capacities 
work or what underlying mechanisms explain their functioning (and malfunctioning). But when 
the sentences flow from your exercising these capacities for imagination, attention, selection, and 
execution, well, then you are the author of your paper or your story. And you deserve some 
measure of credit for the good ones, culpability for the bad ones.  
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So it is with free will, or so I will argue. For an agent to have free will is for her to 
possess the psychological capacities to make decisions—to imagine alternatives for action, to 
select among them, and to control her actions accordingly—such that she is the author of her 
actions and can deserve credit or blame for them. For an agent to choose freely (or act of her own 
free will) is for her to have had (reasonable) opportunity to exercise these capacities in making 
her decision and acting. There’s a lot packed into these initial definitions, some of which won’t 
be unpacked in this chapter. I will focus, first, on the under-appreciated point that these 
capacities for free will, like the capacities for writing, are possessed to varying degrees, and that 
people have better and worse opportunities to exercise them. Free will and free action are graded 
notions: we have degrees of freedom, and accordingly, degrees of responsibility.  
Second, as with the capacities to write, the capacities that underpin free will have both 
structural and normative components. To have normative components means that the capacities 
can function more or less effectively. As with most capacities, such as those involved in 
biological reproduction, perception, riding a bike, or playing piano, there are criteria for what 
counts as their proper functioning, better and worse ways for them to be exercised. In the case of 
free will, as with writing, we cannot formalize these normative components. But clearly there are 
better and worse ways of writing a philosophy paper (ones we aim to teach our students) and 
better and worse papers (which we aim to assess properly when grading them). Similarly, there 
are better and worse ways of making decisions (ones we aim to teach our children) and better 
and worse decisions (which we aim to assess properly when we hold each other or ourselves 
morally responsible). As I discuss in section 2, there is a long philosophical tradition of treating 
free will as the set of capacities that, when properly functioning, allow us to make wise 
decisions, ones that contribute to our leading a good or flourishing life. On this view, free will is 
a psychological accomplishment. 
Regarding structural components, capacities are typically composed of a number of other 
capacities, each of which is enabled by a complex organization of parts or mechanisms; in the 
case of our psychological capacities, these parts are primarily subserved by neural processes. 
Free will is often treated too simplistically, for instance, as a special metaphysical causal power 
or as a faculty to make decisions in light of one’s reasons. While these views have features I 
hope to accommodate, other capacities have been under-appreciated—notably, capacities to 
imagine alternative future courses of action and capacities to control one’s attention as one 
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considers these alternatives. As with authoring a story, the ability to imagine various options and 
consider their merits is a crucial first step in the deliberative process, one that underlies our 
experience of freedom of choice, of having alternatives for action, with any alternative’s 
occurrence causally depending on what one decides. Free will is not just about selecting among 
options, but also about imagining alternatives from which to choose (Sripada ms). Free will also 
includes our abilities to shape our non-deliberative, non-conscious mental activity and to shape 
our situations so that we act in accord with our goals even without exercising the capacities for 
conscious decision-making. Similarly, we are still exercising our capacities to write a story when 
we are lucky enough to have the words flow without our having, at each step, to imagine various 
options and choose among them. 
While these psychological capacities for free will are remarkable, they do not require 
anything metaphysically mysterious. We are far from fully understanding how they work, but 
there is no reason to assume that they are non-natural or non-physical—that is, that they require 
causal powers that cannot be integrated into the mechanisms and laws that organize the physical 
world.1 While some have suggested that free will disappears in light of discoveries that we are 
physical beings governed by the laws of nature (e.g., Harris 2012), on my view, the sciences of 
the mind can help us discover how free will works (Nahmias 2014). Psychology and 
neuroscience will increasingly illuminate the mechanisms that underlie the capacities essential to 
free will, as they have with complex human capacities such as perception, language, and 
memory. These sciences are also discovering that we have less free will than we tend to think—
that our capacities for decision-making do not always meet the normative criteria we think or 
hope they do.  
Conversely, these sciences can also help us find ways to develop the relevant capacities 
more fully. Like other psychological capacities, we gain free will as we develop the relevant 
capacities. As a species, we attained these capacities through a fortuitous evolutionary history. 
As individuals, we develop these capacities as we mature, and we hope to raise our children to 
allow these capacities for free will to develop more fully. In the near future, we will increasingly 
develop methods to alter our psychological capacities more directly, using drugs or neural 
                                                 
1 Whether free will requires that some of those laws are indeterministic is another question, but indeterminism is 
possible even if physicalism is true (as quantum physics shows), and such indeterminism might influence neural 
processes during human decision-making (see Kane 1996). Conversely, some problems allegedly posed by 
determinism remain even assuming a non-naturalist metaphysics (e.g., the impossibility of self-creation; Strawson 
1986). 
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interventions, potentially enhancing our free will and autonomy. We will have to make hard, 
hopefully wise, decisions about which of these interventions will contribute to human flourishing 
(Schaeffer et al. 2014).  
 
2. A brief history of free will 
 
Debates about free will have been overly obsessed with the question of whether free will is 
compatible with determinism, the thesis that the state of the universe at any time, in conjunction 
with the laws of nature, entails the state of the universe at any other time. This is so even though 
the status of determinism is for physics to discover, presumably with no notice of human 
psychology, and even though the dominant theory of physics suggests that determinism is false. 
The recent obsession with determinism was based in part on a definition of free will as the ability 
to do otherwise; for instance, Peter van Inwagen urges us to focus solely on “the free-will thesis” 
that “we are sometimes in the following position with respect to a contemplated future act: we 
simultaneously have both the following abilities: the ability to perform that act and the ability to 
refrain from performing that act” (2008: 329). A substantial proportion of work on free will in 
the past fifty years has been devoted to his Consequence Argument (1983) for the conclusion 
that determinism is incompatible with the ability to do otherwise and to Harry Frankfurt’s 
argument (1969) that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility (and 
perhaps free will). 
These debates are fascinating and important. But they skew the discussion away from 
other important questions, including other potential threats to free will and other crucial 
components of free will. Increasingly, philosophers define free will as the set of abilities to 
control one’s decisions and actions such that it is justified to hold one morally responsible for 
them—that is, such that one can deserve to be blamed or praised for them (O’Connor 2014; 
McKenna & Coates 2015). On this view, there is more to free will than the ability to do 
otherwise. Most theorists recognize this, at least implicitly, whether they are compatibilists about 
free will and determinism or incompatibilists. Indeed, the disagreements among the competing 
theorists conceal a great deal of common ground regarding crucial capacities for free will, 
including cognitive capacities to consciously consider alternatives for action and to make choices 
based on one’s reasons for action.  
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Consider two compatibilist theorists. For Frankfurt an agent with free will possesses “the 
capacity for reflective self-evaluation” (1971: 12) and is “prepared to endorse or repudiate the 
motives from which he acts … to guide his conduct in accordance with what he really cares 
about” (1993: 114). Jay Wallace describes similar capacities in terms of “reflective self-control: 
(1) the power to grasp and apply moral reasons, and (2) the power to control or regulate one’s 
behavior by the light of such reasons” (1993: 157). Now consider two incompatibilist theorists. 
Laura Ekstrom states, “An agent enjoys freedom of action only if the agent’s act results from a 
preference—that is, a desire formed by a process of critical evaluation with respect to one’s 
conception of the good” (2000: 108). And Timothy O’Connor argues that free agents “such as 
ourselves are conscious, intelligent agents, capable of representing diverse, sophisticated plans of 
action,” adding that he is “unable to conceive an agent’s [freely] controlling his own activity 
without any awareness of what is motivating him” (2000: 121, 88). And the list goes on.2 Most 
incompatibilists accept that these capacities for reflective and rational decision-making are both 
necessary for free will and compatible with determinism. But the debate focuses on whether 
some additional power or ability, such as agent-causation, is a further necessary condition for 
free will (see section 5). 
Furthermore, the way earlier philosophers discussed free will suggests that they were not 
focused primarily on the ability to do otherwise, but instead on these capacities for reflection, 
self-knowledge, rationality, and self-control, often with an explicit normative component 
describing the proper functioning of these capacities. Michael Frede (2012) concludes his 
detailed history of the origins of the notion of free will by describing the shared features of the 
range of views he considers, from Aristotle to Stoics to Augustine and many others:  
They all involve the idea that to have a good life one must be able to make the choices 
one needs to make in order to have such a life…. So, to be free, to have a free will, we 
have to liberate ourselves from these false beliefs and from attachments and aversions 
which are not grounded in reality. We can do this, moreover, because the world does not 
systematically force these beliefs, attachments, and aversions on us. (178) 
In other words, free will involves the capacities to make good choices, free from influences that 
distract and detract from such choices. This view of freedom as the set of capacities required to 
                                                 
2 For instance, compatibilists Fischer & Ravizza (1996), Nelkin (2011), Wolf (1990), ‘agnostic’ Mele (2006), 
libertarian Kane (1996), and skeptics about free will, Double (1991) and G. Strawson (1996).  
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make good choices continues with figures such as Aquinas, Locke, Spinoza (a skeptic about 
libertarian free will), and Reid, a proponent of agent-causation, who points out that “moral 
liberty” requires “practical judgment or reason…. [without which] whatever the consequences 
may be, they cannot be imputed to the agent, who had not the capacity of foreseeing them, or of 
perceiving any reason for acting otherwise than he did” (1788, IV).  
We might use some other term, such as ‘autonomy’, to label the capacities for effective 
decision-making and self-determination described above, and reserve ‘free will’ as a 
philosophical term of art to refer to the ability to choose otherwise. But such a move would come 
at the cost of diverting us away from this historical tradition, from important strands of the 
contemporary discussion, especially those linking free will to moral responsibility, and from 
ordinary usage, which takes as paradigmatic of free will humans’ uniquely well-developed 
capacities to deliberate consciously and to make choices without external constraint (e.g., 
Monroe & Malle 2010). 
In any case, my goal is not to offer an analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
free will. Rather, my proposal for analyzing free will seeks reflective equilibrium among our 
ordinary experiences of, and intuitions about, free will, its usage in historical and contemporary 
discussions, and importantly, its connection with other psychological capacities, setting it up for 
scientific exploration rather than quarantining it from such exploration. I will, for the most part, 
assume compatibilism about free will and determinism, rather than arguing that it is the correct 
view (see Nahmias & Deery, ms.) or that it is the intuitive view to most people, as long as they 
are not misunderstanding determinism to mean that the relevant psychological capacities are 
bypassed (Murray & Nahmias, 2014). Regardless of whether compatibilism is true, however, the 
main points of this chapter go through. As suggested above, even incompatibilists think that the 
psychological capacities I describe are important features of free will or of an important variety 
of freedom. We need to analyze these capacities, to study their neuropsychological (structural) 
components, in part to understand the degree to which humans, and different individuals, possess 
them, and to consider their normative components, in part to understand how we might improve 
them and our opportunities to exercise them.  
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3. Some Neglected Capacities for Free Will 
 
Paradigmatic exercises of free will or free choice include some or all of the following 
components, each of which requires specific psychological capacities (referred to by number in 
what follows): 
(1) Recognizing that a decision needs to be made.  
(2) Imagining various options one might take—i.e., imagining different decisions one might 
make and the likely future outcomes of those decisions. 
(3) Evaluating those options and imagined outcomes in light of one’s desires, cares, values, 
goals, and plans. This process includes a capacity to shift attention towards or away from 
considerations one evaluates as more or less relevant. (Some of the most important decisions 
are about which of one’s competing desires, values, goals, and plans one evaluates as more 
important than others.) 
(4) Deciding—i.e., selecting an option. 
(5) Forming relevant intentions to carry out that decision—i.e., forming proximal intentions (to 
act now), forming distal intentions (to act at some later time), or developing more general 
plans of action. 
(6) When necessary, exercising willpower (or strength of will) to act in accord with these 
decisions, intentions, and plans.  
A seventh capacity allows us to act freely—in accord with decisions we’ve made or at least with 
motivations we would accept if we considered them (Nahmias 2007)—and to be potentially 
morally responsible without going through the processes just described: 
(7) Habituation and self-binding—i.e., carrying out actions that significantly increase the 
probability that one will act in accord with prior decisions or plans without conscious 
deliberation or intention-formation at the time of action, including making efforts to alter 
one’s current habits, to regulate one’s emotional reactions, and to structure one’s 
environment to avoid competing temptations. 
 
Some of these components are neglected in discussions of free will, perhaps because they 
are thought to be ‘passive’ rather than ‘active’. Typically, we don’t actively (or consciously) 
control whether and when a problem is posed requiring a decision (item 1) or which specific 
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options come to mind as we deliberate (2), often relevant intentions follow automatically from 
decisions (5), and often we act without conscious deliberation (7). However, we sometimes 
engage in these processes in more active ways, consciously considering what decisions must be 
made today, trying to come up with more options to consider, actively shifting attention away 
from distracting or irrelevant options, and imagining specific action plans in order to prepare 
oneself to carry them out automatically (e.g., as when athletes or musicians imagine 
performances ahead of time).3 In any case, we should not assume that exercising free will only 
involves ‘active’ (e.g., voluntarily controlled) processes. 
Conversely, philosophers, especially compatibilists, have focused their attention on the 
capacities to be reasons-responsive—recognizing and evaluating what reasons one has for 
various options (3) and accordingly deciding (4) and forming intentions (5) (e.g., Fischer & 
Ravizza 1998, Wolf 1990). Others emphasize that the capacities for evaluation and decision must 
be properly sensitive to moral reasons (e.g., Wallace 1993, Scanlon 2008) or to which of our 
first-order desires we identify with (Frankfurt 1971). Finally, theorists are increasingly 
considering the role of willpower, as a limited resource, in free will (e.g., Baumeister & Tierney 
2011). For instance, exerting willpower may be necessary to carry out a proximal intention that 
conflicts with immediate desires (turning off the TV to go exercise) or to continue a plan when 
motivation has drained or other desires crop up (e.g., continuing to work on a philosophy paper 
as one fatigues or when one hears the ping of new email).  
I favor casting a wider net and think we should recognize that all of these capacities are 
properly considered important components of free will. Each contributes to our capacity to make 
effective decisions and to act in ways that express the sort of person we want to be, such that we 
can be held accountable for so acting (Wolf 2015). Each of these capacities has normative 
features—criteria, even if controversial, for better and worse functioning. Each can and should 
be understood as graded—possessed to varying degrees with varying degrees of opportunity to 
exercise them. And each has structural features that can be naturalized and understood better 
with psychological and neurobiological research. Here, however, I want to focus attention on the 
neglected capacity of imagination (2). 
                                                 
3 I am not claiming that any of the processes involved in 1-6 always occur with conscious awareness. We may be 
able to non-consciously evaluate options or form plans. It is an empirical question whether such processes can occur 
as effectively without conscious awareness as with it, but there is some evidence that conscious awareness is 
required for at least some complex mental processes and behaviors (Baumeister et al. 2011; Levy 2014).  
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Our experiences of choice and free will clearly include the experience of there being 
multiple options for future action. It’s contentious whether some of these experiences include 
(even implicitly) the content that these options are possible while also holding fixed all past and 
current conditions and laws of nature (Nahmias et al. 2004; Deery et al. forthcoming). But it 
should not be contentious that, once we recognize that a decision needs to be made (1), we 
typically imagine various future possibilities (2). As we consider these alternatives, we often 
begin imagining (consciously representing) the way they might play out, depending on what we 
do along the way, often letting our minds freely wander further ‘downstream’ into the future and 
into various ‘offshoots’ of the alternatives that may depend on later decisions.  
These capacities to imagine options (and options within options) might seem to 
exaggerate what we ordinarily do during decision-making. I am not suggesting that we exercise 
these capacities every time we make decisions, nor that doing so is required for an action to be 
free, as is evident when we act automatically but autonomously using the relevant capacities (7). 
However, consider the planning you do as you shower, drive, or drift off to sleep, or your 
deliberations as you prepare and then write a paper, or recent experiences making a difficult 
decision, for instance, about what to tell a friend seeking advice or which of your competing 
projects should get priority. We sometimes risk obsessing over a decision—over-imagining and 
over-evaluating options—and may make efforts to stop and make a decision (4). Nonetheless, 
our imagination of future options is what explains not only our experience of freedom—of 
feeling free to actualize any one of a range of options we imagine if we choose it—but also our 
being free, since we often have the capacity and opportunity to actualize a number of options 
depending on which we choose (Sripada ms; Velleman 1989). Conversely, we are typically 
unable to choose an option that we have not even considered. Failures of imagination set limits 
to our freedom.4  
These capacities for imagination are uniquely well-developed in human beings. Few 
other species have evolved the capacities for ‘prospection’ (or mental time travel), which allow 
                                                 
4 While free will is often treated as an internal feature of agents (as in the trope that the prisoner in chains is unfree 
yet still has free will to choose how to react to imprisonment), this view neglects the importance of imagination to 
free will. Our circumstances can limit our opportunities for imagining options: we do not control which alternatives 
pop into consciousness as we consider what to do and we are not able to choose unimagined alternatives. For 
instance, regardless of their capacities, most women during most of history have been raised such that they lacked 
the opportunity to imagine many options for future action open to men. Such constraints, though not literal chains, 
limited women’s opportunities to exercise their capacities for free will, such that these external constraints imposed 
internal constraints. 
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us to represent scenarios far in the future, reason about their probabilities, and vary our 
representations of them consistent with features we hold fixed, such as the laws of nature or our 
goals. If other animals, such as apes or corvids, have these capacities, they appear to represent 
and plan only a short distance into the future (Suddendorf & Corballis 2007; Gilbert & Wilson 
2007). This capacity appears to be related to and subserved by some of the same neural systems 
as other representational capacities involved in episodic memory, counterfactual reasoning, and 
mindreading.5 
These representational capacities, including those involved in imagination, are 
compatible with the truth of determinism. Indeterminism is not required for it to be possible to 
imagine alternative future options or for it to be true that each of these options would (likely) 
occur were we to choose it. All we need here is ‘epistemic freedom’ to veridically believe that 
nothing prevents us from choosing among incompatible imagined options and that each one 
would be ‘made true’ by our choosing it (see Velleman 1989).6 These capacities are also 
consistent with naturalism, at least assuming that arguments that conscious mental states must be 
non-physical are unsound, as I believe they are. Assuming these representational capacities are in 
fact subserved by our remarkably complex brains, then neuropsychological explanations of 
imagination will offer explanations for much of our experience of free will. And assuming that 
neural processes involved in imagination and deliberation have appropriate downstream causal 
effects on our decision-making, then it will be inappropriate to say that these experiences are 
illusory (Nahmias 2014). 
Why are these capacities for imagination particularly important for free will? First, as 
Chandra Sripada (ms.) convincingly argues, they provide “latitude for self-expression” (see also 
Seligman et al. 2013; Kennett & Matthews 2009). They allow one to represent one’s self in 
various future situations and evaluate whether each situation best achieves one’s goals or event 
                                                 
5 These capacities are subserved by the ‘default network’ in the brain, active when people are not carrying out other 
tasks and are instead mind-wandering or imagining (Raichle & Snyder 2007). I suspect our capacities for 
imagination are dependent on, and evolved as side effects from, our capacities for ‘mindreading’ (prediction and 
explanation of others’ behavior based on their mental states), which requires the ability to represent information not 
directly perceived but inferred from observable behavior. Human mindreading capacities may have evolved as part 
of a feedback loop of selection pressures for increasingly subtle deception and detection of deception within 
complex cooperative relationships (including reciprocal altruism). If so, then our ancestors (‘Adam and Eve’) gained 
free will from the fruit of knowledge of other minds and from the sins of subtly manipulating each others’ minds and 
avoiding such manipulation. 
6 However, our experience of imagining alternative options, while we hold fixed other conditions, might help to 
explain our experience of choice as indeterministic (see Deery 2015). 
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best expresses one’s self—whether, for instance, one will be proud of or disappointed with the 
person one imagines in that situation. Like other animals, humans have the capacity to evaluate 
some options without consciously considering them, but just as we (presumably) cannot write 
philosophy papers entirely non-consciously, it seems unlikely that we can evaluate particularly 
complex options without consciously imagining them first. 
Second, barring unlikely neurobiological discoveries suggesting the causal irrelevance of 
the neural activity that subserves imagination, our imagining options or failing to do so literally 
opens or closes possibilities for future action. Typically, one cannot successfully carry out 
complex actions, much less complex plans, unless one has imagined how to do so. Unimagined 
options are typically not really options. What we imagine is hence a difference-making cause in 
what we end up doing. 
Third, imagination is properly tied to our attributions of responsibility. When we blame 
other people or ourselves for making poor or immoral decisions, we often say, “You should have 
known better.” The implication is either that you did know better and still chose a worse 
alternative, perhaps motivated by self-interest or weak exertions of willpower, or that you failed 
to recognize better options. The latter is a type of failure of imagination. In such cases, it is 
sometimes true that you possess the capacities to imagine better options and had requisite 
opportunities (e.g., time) to exercise those capacities, and yet you failed to do so. “Think!” or 
“Think about how that would make him feel!” we say to our friends or children when they screw 
up, often meaning that they should have taken the time to try to imagine the possible (negative) 
effects of their actions and nothing prevented them from doing so. Again, concerns clearly arise 
here about determinism and what counts as a genuine ability or opportunity to exercise capacities 
differently than one actually does. But our ordinary attributions of responsibility seem to involve 
inquiry into whether the agent in question possessed the relevant capacities and had a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise them, both of which have plausible analyses consistent with the potential 
truth of determinism (e.g., Vihvelin 2013).  
If we consciously recognize an option O as a potential action that we have the capacities 
and opportunity to carry out, and we choose not to take it, then we are responsible for choosing 
not to. If we knew O was a (morally) better option, then we are blameworthy for our choice. 
Conversely, we can be praiseworthy for imagining the better option, recognizing it as better, and 
choosing it. However, our control over what options come to mind during deliberation is limited. 
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If we fail to imagine a better option than the one we choose, then it is difficult to determine 
whether we “should have (or could have) known better.”  
Here the role of attention in free will becomes relevant. The idea that we are able to bring 
to mind particular thoughts at will starts to look incoherent if we interpret it to mean that we can 
represent the content of the thought before we represent it or we have to consciously make a non-
conscious idea conscious, and such thinking initiates a problematic regress. It’s not clear that 
people think we have such incoherent abilities (contra Harris 2012). However, we do seem to 
have some degree of ability (a) to shift our attention towards, for instance, the general question, 
“Should I think more (or harder) about the consequences of making this choice or about options 
other than this one?” and (b) to shift our attention away from options that we evaluate as 
inconsistent with our values and goals, as too risky, as impossible to actualize, as irrelevant, etc. 
Developing these capacities for controlling attention as we imagine and evaluate options and 
their consequences is a significant goal of educating our children, students, and each other. Our 
capacity for free will improves as we improve our ability to attend to factors that are relevant to 
our deliberative task and to shift attention away from bad or irrelevant options. 
We should be realistic about the extent to which we have direct volitional control over 
our imagination, evaluation, and attention. Instead, we may often control our decisions, to the 
extent that we do, in more indirect ways. These indirect methods, some of which are involved in 
habituation (7) are another under-explored aspect of our capacities for free will. One habit we 
may try to inculcate in ourselves and others is to regularly ask the question about whether to try 
to think more, but also to know when to stop asking it. We also have capacities to habituate, or 
re-habituate ourselves, so that we manage to act in accord with answers we would offer to these 
questions without having to consider them.  
 
4. Degrees of Freedom and Developing Free Will 
 
For some theories of free will, it’s an awkward question when and how children get free will, 
and when and how our ancestors got it, especially within a naturalistic worldview without sharp 
boundaries based on new metaphysical entities, such as non-physical minds or new types of 
causation. On naturalistic views like mine, we can examine the structural components of 
capacities for free will to find some answers to these questions. This view is, however, consistent 
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with threshold distinctions. Animals or infants with no capacity to imagine multiple future 
options do not possess free will. However, once the relevant capacities are in place, different 
species and different individuals can possess them to varying degrees. In contrast, existing 
discussions of free will seem to suggest that one either has it or doesn’t, perhaps because the 
focus on determinism leads some incompatibilists to conclude we have no free will at all and 
others (libertarians and compatibilists) to argue that humans can have free will without much 
consideration of the degrees of freedom we have.7 Once we understand free will as a set of 
cognitive capacities, we can better consider what causes breakdowns in free will, including the 
usual suspects of addiction, compulsions, insanity, and other disorders of motivation or 
rationality, but also cases less often examined in which people’s capacities for imagination or 
memory may be diminished (Kennett & Matthews 2009). 
In addition to individuals’ possessing the capacities for free will to varying degrees, 
individuals have varying opportunities to exercise these capacities. We’ve all experienced that 
it’s harder to exercise self-control (6) when tired or multi-tasking, but evidence now shows that 
the resources we use for self-control are limited and get depleted, though they can also be built 
up with practice (Baumeister & Tierney 2011). Opportunities to exercise one’s capacities for 
imagining future options can be limited by external constraints imposed by one’s culture (note 
4). They can also be limited by situational factors we do not recognize and would not want to 
influence us if we knew about them (Nahmias 2007). For instance, in bystander intervention 
experiments, the presence of passive bystanders prevents some subjects from imagining the 
situation as one in which their help is required (see Ross & Nisbett 1991). Lack of time and 
energy clearly impose limits on our opportunities to imagine options or properly evaluate them. 
To the degree that we can minimize these limitations, however, we can increase people’s 
opportunities to exercise their free will. 
Finally, we have varying degrees of freedom, and potential for developing free will, 
because of the normative component of the relevant capacities. Our students may have the 
structural capacities to write philosophy papers and ample opportunity to exercise them, but they 
                                                 
7 Note that compatibilism is just a claim about the possibility of free will in a deterministic universe, not the thesis 
that humans actually have it. Yet historically, all compatibilists have suggested that humans have free will and have 
focused little attention on other potential threats to free will (e.g., epiphenomenalism or limitations on our capacities 
for rational decision-making) or the degree to which such threats may be actual for humans. “Cagey compatibilism” 
is my name for the view that says determinism is irrelevant to free will but other theses and potential scientific 
findings are relevant to free will and could suggest we have less than we think 
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have varying abilities to write good papers. Determining the normative criteria for possessing 
effective capacities for, and admirable exercises of, free will is at least as difficult as answering 
many other normative questions. But let me briefly offer three suggestions. 
First, there are two ‘internal’ criteria for effectively exercising free will. One is imagining 
options that will advance one’s goals, values, and interests, as one understands them. People 
succeed in exercising free will to the extent that they imagine new and more effective ways of 
acting to achieve their own goals and to act in accord with their values. Indeed, people feel more 
free when they imagine better options and effectively select one, more so than when they simply 
imagine more options or remain uncertain about which to select (Lau et al. 2015; Nahmias et al. 
2004). A second criterion involves managing to actualize what one has imagined as the best 
future course of action, primarily by forming effective intentions and plans (5) (Bratman 1987), 
exercising self-control as necessary (6), and habituating oneself to act accordingly (7). Both of 
these internal criteria involve making one’s imagined future match the actual future, but neither 
requires that the goals or values one succeeds in carrying out are actually good, morally or 
pragmatically. 
The third criterion for accomplishing free will is more ‘external.’ It involves imagining, 
evaluating, and actualizing options that advance the goals, values, and interests that one should 
have. Here, the view Frede attributed to historical figures comes to the fore, since it suggests that 
free will includes the capacity to make choices that will contribute to a good or flourishing life 
(cf. Wolf 1990). I find this idea attractive, since I think it takes imagination and creativity to 
recognize options better than existing ones, including for our own life and our culture, and 
options that are better than our more ‘default’ behaviors (e.g., to be self-interested or to act on 
immediate motivations rather than on other-directed or long-term interests). To the extent that we 
can imagine new options, including better goals or values and better ways of achieving existing 
goals, we gain freedom.  
There is a seemingly paradoxical feature of this view. Those individuals who possess to 
lesser degrees the capacities for free will, or have worse opportunities to exercise them, will 
often be the individuals who make bad choices, ones that negatively impact their own and others’ 
lives. If so, the people who make choices we are most inclined to blame, or most resent, are often 
those who, on this view, are less responsible for those choices. I think this is a feature we should 
learn to live with. Once we better understand the limitations on free will, we should accordingly 
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cultivate both forgiveness towards, and a desire to help develop, the capacities and opportunities 
of those who make bad choices due to these limitations. I take this response to be more 
humanistic and pragmatic than the one suggested by those who argue that we all lack free will 
entirely, so that no one genuinely deserves any blame or retributive punishment, a view which 
suggests we should treat wrongdoers on a disease model that requires rehabilitation when 
possible, and quarantine when not (e.g., Harris 2012; Pereboom 2014).  
It may also turn out that we all possess the relevant capacities and opportunities to a 
lesser degree than we tend to think. For instance, we may be ‘built’ not to prospectively imagine 
and evaluate options rationally but instead to rationalize and justify our existing motivations and 
prior decisions. And we may be influenced by unnoticed situational factors or unconscious biases 
significantly more than we think. If so, then empirical investigation may help us recognize these 
limitations and ways to overcome them. 
 
5. Free Will as Forward-looking 
 
The views developed in this chapter suggest that free will involves a set of skills or knowledge. 
The capacities for imagining possibilities for action and their potential outcomes allow us to 
know what we could do. The capacities for evaluating these options allow us the potential to 
know what we should do. And the capacities involved in self-control and habituation involve 
knowing how to do what we decide or plan to do.  
Agents have free will to the extent that they possess these capacities for imagination, 
decision-making and self-control. They “have what it takes” to act of their own free will and to 
be responsible for what they do. Such agents do not always have the opportunity to exercise 
these capacities when they act. They may be constrained by external pressures or persons or 
compelled by internal pressures in such a way that they have no (or less) reasonable opportunity 
to exercise their capacities for free will. Without such opportunities, they are typically not 
responsible (or less responsible) for that action. Finally, agents may or may not actually exercise 
their capacities for free will even when they do have the opportunity to. If they do, they will 
typically be responsible (and blameworthy for bad choices, unless they could not be expected to 
have known relevant obligations or information). If they do not exercise their capacities for 
choice and control even though they had the opportunity, then they are also typically responsible, 
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in this case for their failure of imagination, attention, or effort (“You should have known better” 
or “You should have tried harder”). Hence, if agents are not exempt because they lack the 
relevant capacities for free will or if agents are not excused because they lack the relevant 
opportunity to exercise these capacities, then they are responsible for what they do. They deserve 
credit or blame for their actions; they are an appropriate target of gratitude or resentment; it may 
be fair to reward or punish them (Strawson 1962).8  
Those used to the traditional philosophical debates about free will may still be wondering 
how the capacities for free will I’ve described help answer the ancient worries about determinism 
or more recent worries about naturalism. This chapter has not focused on answering arguments 
that free will is incompatible with determinism or naturalism. In part because I think the default 
or intuitive view is neither incompatibilist nor non-naturalist (Nahmias et al. 2014), I think 
compatibilists should not play defense so much. Rather, we should offer the most viable positive 
account of how our capacities for imagination, decision-making, and self-control work and how 
they explain our experiences of and beliefs about free will, and only then consider whether they 
require indeterminism or more ‘metaphysically robust’ powers.  
Here, I’ve asked us to focus on the forward-looking features of free will, especially our 
psychological capacity to imagine future possibilities that do not yet exist, as well as capacities 
to shift our attention towards possibilities that cohere with our goals and values and to habituate 
ourselves to act accordingly. Once we focus on these capacities, we can ask whether they could 
exist and have the appropriate causal relations with future behavior if it turned out that 
determinism or naturalism were true. 
Responding to the ‘bottom-up’ problem of naturalism is relatively easy. It is a mistake to 
think that our forward-looking capacities are causally irrelevant, or bypassed, if they are 
subserved by neural processes. Instead, naturalism simply suggests that we will eventually 
understand how free will works in the brain, not that we will or should come to see it as an 
illusion because it works in the brain. Assuming the eventual neurobiological theory of our 
conscious representational capacities does not eliminate their causal role, then there is no reason 
to assume naturalism threatens free will (Nahmias 2014). The fact that, in some sense, “my brain 
                                                 
8 I say ‘may be’ fair because there are moral questions about when and what types of punishment are fair that go 
beyond questions of free will. Compatibilists are sometimes expected establish that we can have the sort of free will 
that justifies retributive punishment, but there may be independent reasons to reject the fairness of some forms of 
retribution. 
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did it” does not compete with my having done, and recognizing this allows us to see that 
naturalism does not entail bypassing of our conscious selves or of our capacity to shape our 
future lives based on what we imagine them to be. 
The ‘backwards-looking’ problem of determinism is more difficult to brush aside. One 
worry is that determinism would entail that we can never do otherwise, never have an 
opportunity to exercise our capacities for choice differently than we actually do. Though it won’t 
satisfy many incompatibilists, this worry is best addressed by arguing that the ability to do 
otherwise, holding fixed all conditions and laws, is not the best analysis of the capacities and 
opportunities required for free and responsible agency (e.g., Vihvelin 2013).  
Another worry is that determinism would entail that we are not the causal source of our 
decisions because they have prior causes ultimately beyond our control (this worry does not 
dissipate even if some causes are indeterministic). Again, by focusing on the forward-looking 
causal effects of our capacity to actualize one, among several, imagined future options, we can 
recognize that determinism does not entail bypassing of these causal effects, which will diffuse 
some of the more intuitive threats from determinism (Murray & Nahmias 2014). Furthermore, 
determinism does not entail that there are any particular variables beyond our control (e.g., in 
the distant past) that cause our decisions; instead, our deliberations are the nexus of an ever-
expanding set of prior causes, such that, among those causes, our exercising our capacities for 
free will can often be picked out as the causal difference-maker, or most significant causal 
explanation, for our actions. Even if determinism is true, no variable better explains some of our 
decisions than the variables involved in our imagining and evaluating future options (Nahmias & 
Deery ms.).  
Even if one imagines some further condition for free will would somehow provide a more 
satisfying response to these alleged threats from naturalism or determinism, the capacities I’ve 
identified with free will are a psychological accomplishment. We can imagine and write our own 
stories in impressive ways that open up real options unavailable to creatures lacking these 
capacities.9  
 
  
                                                 
9 For helpful comments on this chapter, I thank Chandra Sripada, Andrea Scarantino, Oisin Deery, Adina Roskies, 
and participants at a workshop at the Center for the Philosophy of Freedom at University of Arizona.  
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